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son for a different result, the issuer should have to bear the loss for
all unauthorized purchases in cases where there is no risk-allocation
provision in the credit card contract. This rule should apply unless
the holder is negligent in handling his card and his negligence does
in fact contribute to the fraudulent purchases. But where there is a
risk-allocation provision in the credit card contract the strict objec-
tive intent of the parties as expressed in the contract should control.
PETR W. MARTON.
APPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL RULES IN
DIVERSITY CASES
The extent to which a federal court in diversity actions will apply
federal procedural law when it affects the outcome of the case is one of
the most confusing problems presently facing an attorney.' A particu-
larly important aspect of this problem occurs when a state statute
clashes directly with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
2
In Hanna v. Plumer,3 the Supreme Court of the United States re-
cently faced an unavoidable clash between the Federal Rules and a
conflicting state statute. The plaintiff filed her negligence complaint in
a federal district court in Massachusetts on diversity grounds. Service
was made by leaving a copy of the complaint and summons with the
defendant's wife at the defendant's house as provided by Federal
Rule 4 (d)(i). Defendant was executor of the alleged tortfeasor's es-
tate. The relevant Massachusetts statute, however, requires personal
service on a decedent's personal representative to be in hand.4 Two
1"It is unquestionably true that up to now Erie and the cases following it have
not succeeded in articulating a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diver-
sity actions." Hanna v. Plumer, 38o U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (concurring opinion); Wright,
Federal Courts § 55, at 194 (1963); "Every important step in a federal diversity
case is taken today at a calculated risk. Litigants must constantly decide whether
this procedure, or that procedure, should be taken in accordance with the Rules
or as prescribed by state law." Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on
the Federal Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 711, 712 (1950); compare Ragan v. Merchants
Txansfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) with Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
337 U.S. 535 (949) and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949). In these three decisions handed down on the same day, only a minority of
four justices could agree on what Erie meant in all three cases.
2Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, in Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice 170, 193 (1965); Wright,
Federal Courts § 59, at 2o8 (1963).
338o US. 460 (1965).
'Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 197 § 9 (1956).
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days before the running of the Massachusetts statute of limitations de-
fendant filed his answer, in which he alleged improper service of pro-
cess. The District Court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment and held that service of process substantially affected the out-
come of the case, hence was a substantive matter governed by state
law.5 The Circuit Court affirmed0 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.7
The Supreme Court reversed and hefd that the Federal Rules were
exempt from the general distinction between substance and procedure
which is usually applied to determine whether state or federal law
governs.8 Early in its opinion the Court revised the old distinction be-
tween substance and procedure and indicated that "outcome deter-
mination" is no longer the proper testP The fact that an action may be
barred in a state system will not necessarily bar it in the federal sys-
tem. A difference in the outcome of a case between state and federal
forums is substantial only when the discrepancy is important enough
to promote that kind of forum-shopping which results in inequitable
administration of the law.'0 This alone would be enough to decide
the case, assuming, as the Court seems to, that the action would be
barred in the Massachusetts courts."'
'Hanna v. Plumer, 38o U.S. 460, 462 (1965).
0331 F.2d 157 (1964).
'379 U.S. 813 (1964).
""There is, however, a more fundamental flaw in respondent's syllogism: the
incorrect assumption that the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the ap-
propriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure .... The line between 'substance' and 'procedure'- shifts as the legal
context changes .... It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say,
roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedur-
al' law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were
designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered by
one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical,
relatively unguided Erie choice .... Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 46o, 469-70, 471
(1965).
"Technically, as pointed out by the majority on pages 467-68 and by the con-
curring opinion on page 475, the distinction now adopted by the court is not novel
but implicit in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 Although the Court talks as though these are two distinct policies, it should
be apparent that they are but different sides of the same coin. There seems to be
nothing wrong with forum shopping per se, which, after all is the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. As Justice Harlan points out on p. 475, litigants frequently choose the
federal forum just for the procedural conveniences of Federal Rules, and this
type of forum shopping is sanctioned by the Court. The Court will strike down
forum shopping of the kind which allows one party to take unfair advantage of the
other, i.e. inequitable administration of the law.
2If the action were not barred in Massachusetts then the Erie-Guaranty test
would be met and there would be no controversy for the Court to decide. On p.
466, the court cites defendant-respondents' contention that the action was barred
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The Court went further, however, and distinguished for the first
time two mutually exclusive lines of cases in this area: the line of
cases following Erie R.R. v. Tompkins12 which defines substance and
procedure in areas not covered by the Rules, and the cases following
Sibbach v. Wilson &Co.,13 which test the validity of the Rules under
the Rules Enabling Act.14 If a rule is found valid and applicable in
any particular case, then the federal rule prevails over any conflicting
state rule.15 WVith this pronouncement the Supreme Court has express-
ly defined, for the first time, the relation of the Federal Rules to the
Erie doctrine: The Rules are exempt from the Erie distinction of sub-
stance and procedure. 1 If a Federal Rule can rationally be classified as
involving procedure, then it is applied regardless of any incidental
substantive effects.
The relation of the Federal Rules to the Erie doctrine has been
the subject of much conjecture17 since 1938 when the Supreme Court
in Massachusetts and nowhere states that that premise is incorrect. Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 260 § 32 (1956) provides:
"If, in an action duely commenced within the time limited in this chapter,
the writ fails of a sufficient service or return by reason of unavoidable accident, or
of a default or neglect of the officer... plaintiff... may commence a new action
for the same cause within one year after the abatement or other determination
of the original action...."
12304 U.S. 64 (1938). E.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525
(1958); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. In-
terstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
13312 U.S. 1 (1941); see also Gertler v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Bowles v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 5 F.R.D. 230 (D. Minn. 1946).
1428 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
"Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (concurring opinion); see majority
opinion at 472. The problem arises however as to when a particular rule does apply
to a given fact situation. According to the Court, Rule 3, "A civil action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the court," does not, for the purpose of statutes
of limitations, apply to determine when a civil action commences. See Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 53o (1949), as interpreted by footnote
12 of the principal case. See also note 32 infra.
16This statement of what the court says the rule is, should be taken with a
grain of salt considering the Court's elastic view of what the rules cover. See supra
note 15.
'1E.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, in Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice 170 (1965); Clark,
The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 158 (1941); Holtzoff,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Raidroad Co. v. Tompkins, 24
J. Am. Jud. Soc*y 57 (194o); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on
the Federal Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 711 (1950); Symposium-Federal Trials and
The Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 338 (1956); Note, 38 Geo. L.J. 115 (1949);
Note 39 Geo. L.J. 6oo (1951); Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1949).
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decided Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 8 In Erie the Supreme Court overruled
the ninety-six year old Swift v. Tyson,' 9 in which the Court had held
that a federal district court was not bound to apply the state decisional
substantive law which would govern the same action in a state court.
The purpose of Swift was to protect non-residents from discrimination
in a foreign court by providing an impartial arbiter and by subject-
ing both citizen and non-citizen to the uniformity of the common law
in areas involving "general" law.20 However, enforcement of the lat-
ter policy created new problems. The co-existence of separate bodies
of state and federal law often gave the non-citizen the advantage of
selecting the more favorable law of the federal forum while a citizen
in an identical action against another citizen was confined to the
less favorable law of the forum state.2 1 The nadir of this policy was
reached in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co.,2 2 in which a Kentucky corporation succes-
fully dissolved and reincorporated just across the state line, thereby
gaining diverse citizenship in order 'to seek against a competitor an
injunction allowed under federal but not state law.
In Erie the Court tried to cure these defects in our legal system by
holding that a federal district court must apply the substantive law of
the state in which it sits, as defined by that state's highest court.23 Erie's
thesis is to provide equal treatment for all regardless of their state
citizenship.24 In 1938 the Court also promulgated the nationally uni-
form Rules of Civil Procedure.
Any inconsistency in adopting both the Erie and the Federal Rules
'8304 U.S. 64 (1938); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, in Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice 17o,
171 (1965), quotes Judge Learned Hand as saying, "I don't suppose a civil appeal
can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or later quoting large portions of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." See also Id. at 172; Wright, Federal Courts § 55, at 191
k 193 (1963).
241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 14 (1842).
"'See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 ('945); Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 14, 18-19 (1842).
"'Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 524 (1928); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism:
"Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Thompkins. 34 Ill. L. Rev.
271, 277-78 (1939)"
2276 U.S. 518 (1928).
"This statement is admittedly an oversimplification of the many other inherent
problems of Erie such as the determination of which state law-the conflicts prob-
lem-and the determination of what the decisional law of a particular state is,
but a discussion of all the problems posed by Erie is a better subject for a treatise
than a comment.
"4See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 3o4 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
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policies was not noticed at first. The courts attempted to combine the
two policies into the widespread maxim that federal courts sitting
in diversity cases apply their own procedural law and the substantive
law of the state in which the federal court sits.25 In other quarters an
awareness was growing that Erie could pose a threat to the Federal
Rules, but the general outlook was optimistic. 2 Judge Charles Clark,
in a characteristic statement of the times, suggested that the Supreme
Court would not overthrow most of the Federal Rules or even, perhaps
an unusual number.
27
In the next leading case on the subject, however, Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 28 the Court drew the following distinction between sub-
stance and procedure:
[D]oes is significantly affect the result of a litigation for a
federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be con-
trolling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties
in a State court?... The nub of the policy that underlies Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the acci-
dent of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court in-
stead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a sub-
stantially different result.
29
This extension by Guaranty constitutes what is generally referred to
as the Erie-Guaranty doctrine, which is, that the outcome of a case in
a federal court sitting in diversity should be the same as though the
case had been brought in a state court.8 0 "As to consequences that
so intimately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a di-
versity case should follow State law."3' 1 The rather obvious implica-
tion for the Federal Rules was generally ignored until three years
2E.g., Jessen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 209 F.2d 453 (7 th Cir. 1954); Deupree v.
Levinson, 186 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1950); Turner County v. Miller, 17o F.2d 820
(8th Cir. 1948).
2E.g. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 158
(1941); Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 24 J. Am. Jur. Soc'y 57 (1949)-
0Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie
v. Tompkins, in Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice 170, 187 (1965).
21326 U.S. 99 (1945); Wright, Federal Courts § 55, at 193 (1963).
'*326 U.S. at log.
3°Quite obviously the 'Erie doctrine' as it is now modified by Hanna no longer
means exactly this. "'Outcome determination' analysis was never intended to serve
as a talisman." 38o U.S. at 466-67,where the Hanna court discusses the Byrd case.
However, it is submitted that this definition is the one generally, even if loosely,
used now by most attorneys when they speak of the 'Erie doctrine.' "The governing
doctrine might be better described if it took its name from [Guaranty Trust Co. v.]
York than Erie." Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the
Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 Yale L.J. 187, 187-88 (1957).
3tGuaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 11O (1945).
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later 32 when the Supreme Court dropped a judicial bombshell on the
hopes of the Federal Rules supporters.
On June 20, 1949, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions
which held a Federal Rule inapplicable and applied a state statute
to determine the procedure in question.33 Both cases said that since the
liability imposed was created by state law, the procedures prescribed
for enforcing that liability were important (i.e. substantive) enough to
be governed by state law.34 These decisions raised many doubts about
'See e.g., Note, 21 Ind. L.J. 228 (1946); 44 Mich L. Rev. 165 (1945); Note, 44
Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1945); 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 145 (1946); Note, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195
(1946); 31 Va. L. Rev. 948 (1945).
nCohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (Statute re-
quiring bond in a stockholder's derivative action held substantive despite Rule 23
which provided for procedure in stockholder's derivative action and which made no
mention of bond); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949) (For purposes of limitation of actions, a state statute which stated that an
action was commenced when process was served was the governing rule instead of
Federal Rule .3 which stated that an action* was commenced when complaint was
filed.) The Court attempted to distinguish these two cases from Hanna by holding
that in Ragan and Cohen "the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the
losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the
point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law." See Hanna at 470.
See also supra note 12. The validity of this distinction is doubtful to say the least,
and one prominent district court has agreed with Justice Harlan that Ragan was
wrongly decided. "The case at bar cannot he distinguished from Ragan v. Mer-
chants Transfer & Warehouse Co.... Study of Hanna v. Plumer, above, convinces
me that its reasoning points away from Ragan. Hazardous though it be, I must
therefore conclude that the Supreme Court after Hanna would no longer follow
Ragan.... [H]ere, Rule 3 is plainly applicable. [Query, why wasn't it also in
Ragan?] As to 'forum shopping'... there was ample time to satisfy the require-
ments in either court. Rule 3, therefore, could not possibly have influenced the
choice of forum .... The spirit of the Hanna decision-if not its letter-indicates
that this motion must be denied." Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 244 Fed. Supp.
524, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
""Since that cause of action is created by local law, the measure of it is to
be found only in local law. It carries the same burden and is subject to the same
defences in the federal court as in the state court .... It accrues and comes to an
end when local law so declares .... Where local law qualifies or abridges it, the
federal court must follow suit. Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause
of action in one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
bins is trangressed.
"We cannot give it longer life in the federal court than it would have had
in the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not
do that consistently with Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949).
"[T]his statute is not merely regulation of procedure.... [I]t creates a new lia-
bility where none existed before.... If all the Act did was to create this liability
it would clearly be substantive. But this new liability would be without meaning
and value in many cases if it resulted in nothing but judgment for expenses at or
after the end of the case. Therefore, a procedure is prescribed by which the liability
is insured .... We do not think a statute which so conditions the stockholder's
action can be disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device." Cohen
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949)-
1966]
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the future of the Federal Rules,35 and suggestions ranged from abol-
ishing the Federal Rules in diversity cases 36 to always applying the
more restrictive of the state or federal rule.3 7 Another suggestion was
to balance the policies of each particular rule with Erie and work out
a point-by-point compromise.38
In the last important case before Hanna, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Ru-
ral Elec. Co-op.,3 9 the Court indicated that the outcome-determina-
tive policy of the Erie-Guaranty doctrine was not to be the sole test and
incorporated into the concept of "substantive" law any "integral" part
of a statute defining the rights of the parties. A rule not intended to be
bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the par-
ties is not a matter of substantive law to be governed by state statute.
40
The implicit rejection in Hanna4' of the integral-relations test seems
to indicate that Byrd was decided purely on the federal policy of right
to a trial by jury.4 2
Assuming that the court has, as it says it has, defined the relation
of the Federal Rules to Erie,43 the question remains whether this
definition will provide the workable doctrine sought by Justice Har-
lan is his concurring opinion.4 4 It appears that it will not. The judi-
cial standard that federal courts sitting in diversity cases apply the
substantive law of the state and their own procedural law is to a cer-
tain extent a self-defeating proposition resulting from an attempt to
achieve two goals which are not necessarily consistent with each other:
mSee e.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins in Procedure-The Handmaid of Justice 170, 195 (1965); Gavit,
States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 Ind. L.J. 1 (1949); Horowitz, Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins-A Test to Determine Those Rules of State Law to which Its Doctrine
Applies, 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 204 (195o); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple
Play on the Federal Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 711 (1950); Weary Erie, 34 Cornell
L.Q. 494 (1949); Note, 3o B.U.L. Rev. 104 (195o); Clark, Book Review, 36 Cornell
L.Q. 181 (195o).
31Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 Vand.
L. Rev. 711, 727 (1950).
'Note, 35 Cornell L. Q. 420 (195o).3Symposium-Federal Trials and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 338 (1956).
3 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Wright, Federal Courts § 55, at 194 (1963).
10356 U.S. at 536.
""The purpose of the Erie doctrine, even as extended in York and Ragan, was
never to bottle up federal courts with 'outcome-determinative' and 'integral-
relations' stoppers...." Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764
(5 th Cir. 1963), quoted with approval in Hanna at 473. (Emphasis added.)
'Byrd was based on two grounds: (i) Federal policy of right to trial by jury
and (2) integral-relation of statutes. Subtract "integral-relations" and the policy
basis is all that is left.
"Note that this is an assumption, since the Court left itself the power to ex-
tend Erie and restrict the Federal Rules by the Cohen-Ragan approach.
"38o U.S. at 474-78.
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(i) the judicial establishment of a good federal procedure which is
uniform, and (2) the prevention of substantial advantage-taking by
one party's forum shopping.
The Court's adherence to the second policy is obvious. Prevention
of substantially advantageous forum shopping has been the basis
of the Erie-Guaranty policy from its inception to the present.45 Even
in Hanna the Court implied that the plaintiff was not motivated by
an intent to gain an unfair advantage in his choice of forum, and,
in fact, had not obtained any advantage in the federal foium which was
not available in the state court.40 The Court's adherence to the first
policy is demonstrated by the reason given for granting certiorari:
"Because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure
posed by the decision below...."47
At the present time two facts make these two policies potentially
incompatible. First, a majority of jurisdictions have procedural proces-
ses which differ significantly from the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.48 Second, procedure does have some affect on the outcome of
' See cases in note 12, esp. Guaranty. However, the Court's approach cannot be
explained by this factor only. This principle was certainly violated in Ragan and
arguably in Hanna. In Ragan the plaintiff was not forum shopping, while the
defendant certainly seemed to be taking advantage of a procedural device to win
the case, see facts of Ragan, 17o F.2d 987 at 988-9o . The Court's judgment for the
defendant is impossible to reconcile with the notion that the sole underlying ap-
proach of the Court is prevention of substantially advantageous forum shopping.
Although, as the Court implied in Hanna, the plaintiff was not motivated by a
forum shopping motive and in fact did not achieve any initial advantage; never-
theless, the Court did grant her a judgment to which she was not then, or maybe
ever, entitled in the state system.
""See Hanna at 469, 463 n.i.
'71d. at 463. This approach emphasizes the other goal of the Court: the Judicial
creation of a modern, viable, consistent judicial system which is uniform through-
out. Thus Hanna could be read as one of several cases where in borderline areas
the courts are deciding cases on some unarticulated theory analogous to the federal
supremacy theory. This aproach could consistently explain both Hanna and Ragan.
The apparent anomaly in Ragan could he explained by this approach as an attempt
by the Court to maintain a consistent procedural nicety (outcome-determination
analysis established by Guaranty) which has since been abandoned. This approach
alone, however, can explain neither Guaranty nor Cohen where the Court apparent-
ly prevents forum shopping at the expense of uniform procedure. Thus the best
approach seems to be that the Court is trying to implement both policies.
'914 states have no provision comparable to Federal Rule 35a order for physical
examination; Ala., Conn., Ind., Mass., Miss., N.H., N.J.. N.C., Okla., Ohio., Ore.,
S.C., Tenn., Texas (provision for physical or mental exam repealed, Tex. R. Civ. P.
168), and three others restrict such exams to actions for personal injury, Hawaii
Rev. Law § 225-2 (1955) (provision for physical exam only), R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.
§ 9-17-21 (1956) (provision for physical and mental examination), Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 269.57 (2) (1963) (provision for physical exam only). 5 States have pretrial and
other discovery device differences which are 'significant' at least in the way "sig-
nificent" is used in Hanna; see Ala. Code tit. 7 §§ 474(1)-47408) (1958) (no pro-
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a case. 49 Given the same case, therefore, its outcome must vary between
vision for production of documents, requests for admissions, written interrogatories
or other discovery devices except depositions); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-201 (1947) (very
restrictive provision for pretrial disposition of case, no summary judgment, no
enforcement provision comparable to Federal Rule 37 to enforce pretrial disposi-
tion of case); Deering, Gal. Civ. Proc. §§ 2016-2034 (discovery provisions "made for
the express purpose of creating in California a system of discovery procedures less
restrictive than those employed in the Federal Courts," Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Coot, 56 Cal. App. 355, 364 P.2d 2,66, 274, 15 Cal. Rptr. 9o, 98 (1961) (holding
an attorney's work product not to be privileged). Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 11o, § 53 (Smith-
Hurd 1956) ("Illustrative of federal provisions which the committee rejected are....
That part of federal rule -6 (b) permitting a deponent to be examined on matter
inadmissible at the trial 'which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence' is omitted from [the] new Illinois rule...." Sympo-
sium, 5o Nw. U.L. Rev. 586, 594 (1955); Mont. Rules 56 (affidavits may not be con-
sidered on motion for summary judgment).
to states have rules which differ 'significantly' from the federal rules in pleading
and joinder. See Senter v. B. F. Goodrich,, infra note 52, Gerber v. Schutte Inv. Co.
354 Mo. 1246, 194 S.W.2d 25 (1946) (traditional fact pleading retained in Missouri),
Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957) (abolishing the difference be-
tween parties and indispensable parties); Ind. Rules 1:1-3:26 ("[Tjhe rules so adopted
[by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1954 as rules of civil procedure] have made
little significant change in procedure. A rule providing for pre-trial conferences
[1:1-4] is the only rule seemingly derived from the federal rules." 1 Barron & Holt-
zoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 9.15 (g6o, Supp. 1965); Iowa Rules 67-120
("the most marked difference [between Iowa rules and the Federal Rules] is in the
section on pleadings where 'fact pleading' as developed under the [Field] code was
retained." i Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 9.16 (1960, Supp.
1965); Me. Rule 38 (Plaintiff required to assert any claim he has against a third
party defendant on penalty of being barred from later suit on it); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 231 § 59 (1961) ("Changes in Massachusetts practice to conform to modern
developments elsewhere seem to be limited principally to provision, by rule [58],
for pretrial conferences, and statutory adoption [supra] of a rather rudimentary
summary judgment procedure, available only in contract actions." i Barron &
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 9.22 (1960, Supp. 1965); Mich. G.C.R.
2084 (provision for protection of parties by bond in class action); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1-123 (1953) (In a suit involving multiple plaintiffs or defendants, all causes must
affect all parties); Pa. R. Civ. P. oo1-1458 (retention of forms of action, with
limited or no joinder of different forms); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2309.05 (Bald-
win 1964) (in action involving multiple defendants all causes of action must affect
all defendants).
Although the Federal Rules have influenced most if not all jurisdictions to a
degree, the influence has been in different areas of procedure with the result that
even though a state may have adopted some or even many of the Federal Rules in
some area (e.g., discovery), there may be other procedual processes (e.g., bond as in
the Cohen case) which differ "significantly," as that word is used in either Guaranty
or Hanna, from the federal rules. A leading text lists only nineteen jurisdictions
which have adopted rules "substantially similar" to the federal rules. See x Barron
& Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 9, at 44 (ig6o, Supp. 1965).
"Wright, Federal Courts § 55, at 194; cf. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree
326 U.S. 438, 44.5 (1945) as quoted in Hanna at 465. The most obvious examples are
the discovery devices and the right to physical examination. In an actual case,
plaintiff alleged that lie slipped on an oil slick on defendant's trailn, wrenched a
back muscle badly, and immediately checked into a hotel where lie remained for
CASE COMMENTS
state and federal forums in the same state to the extent that state pro-
cedures which affect substantive rights of the parties vary from the
Federal Rules.
This result can be antagonistic to the policy of prevention of sub-
stantially advantageous forum shopping since the subtle interrela-
tionship between substance and procedure, by its very nature prohibits
the policy seemingly adopted by the Court, of allowing procedural but
not substantive forum-shopping. The Court has given no way to pre-
dict the result when one party goes to the federal forum with the
avowed intent of getting a real procedural, outcome-affecting, advan-
tage not allowed by state law when to deny him that advantage in the
federal court would completely or substantially gut a federal rule
and by implication the Federal Rules as a body of procedural law.
The Court did not have to face this ultimate conflict in Hanna
between a compelling reason for systematic uniformity against an
equally compelling case of advantage-seeking forum shopping since
the underlying purpose of both the state and federal rule had been
fulfilled, leaving no reason to worry about forum shopping. The pur-
pose of the Massachusetts statute and the Federal Rule is to give the
defendant actual notice.5o "In this case the goal seems to have been
achieved.... [T]he affidavit filed by respondent.., does not allege
lack of actual notice."' 1 Had the application of either the state or the
federal rule resulted in frustration of the purpose of the other rule
thereby creating an actual advantage not provided by the state court,
for example, had Mr. Plumer not received actual notice, then a far
more difficult problem would have been presented to the Court.
5 2
two weeks, thereby losing two weeks work as well as having to pay medical ex-
penses and suffering great bodily pain. Defendant sprang two "surprise" witnesses:
the plaintiff's army doctor who testified that plaintiff had a long history of back
troubles, and the hotel clerk who testified that plaintiff did not check into the
hotel immediately after the time of the alleged injury but four hours later. There-
upon plaintiff was nonsuited. Under the same fact situation in a federal court,
plaintiff could have "discovered" defendant's knowledge of both the medical his-
tory and the time variance. An amended complaint of aggravation of a pre-existing
injury with delayed reaction to the injury would have at least gotten plaintiff to
the jury. Quite obviously procedure can affect rights beyond the "incidental effects"
cited by the Court.
1138o U.S. at 463, n.i.
"Ibid.
'-"The courts may avoid the question by pretending that the conflict doesn't
exist. Cf. Senter v. B. F. Goodrich, 127 F. Supp. 704, 707 (1954) ("Federal Rule 18 ...
does not alter the state substantive law which prohibits the simultaneous urging
of inconsistent claims....." The court then said there was no conflict because
a claim in tort was not inconsistent with a claim in contract covering the same
transaction.)
It should be noted that the present inconsistency in the policies of equal pro-
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